To mitigate potential contagion from future banking crises, the European Commission recently proposed a framework which would provide for the bail-in of bank creditors in the event of failure. In this study, we examine this framework retrospectively in the context of failed European banks during the global financial crisis.
Introduction
The credit crunch or global financial crisis, which begun in 2007, is the most severe since the great depression and has been characterised by the large number of distressed and failed systemically important financial institutions (Acharya, 2013; Veronesi and Zingales, 2010; Brunnermeier, 2009) . The crisis has highlighted the ongoing need for a robust and consistent mechanism to allow for the resolution of failed banks (Laeven and Valencia, 2010) . In particular, the European response to the large number of distressed banks has been fragmented and capricious (Schich and Kim, 2012) . Individual European Union member states took a uncoordinated approach to the crisis, re-capitalizing and nationalizing a range of domestic financial institutions (Dübel, 2013) . Ultimately, this approach may have contributed to financial contagion as investors had little clarity regarding the resolution mechanism to be adopted across nations, potentially resulting in a 'flight-to-safety' (De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Longstaff, 2010; Mizen, 2008) .
In order to mitigate potential contagion from a distressed banking sector, in 2012 the European Commission proposed a Framework for Bank Recovery and Resolution (BRR) (The European Commission, 2012a) .
1,2 This was recently supplemented by the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), through which the ECB will apply the proposals on bank resolution, (The European Commission, 2013) .
Within these frameworks, failed banks will be recapitalized either through the mandatory write-down of liabilities or, alternatively, the conversion of liabilities to equity (a bail-in of creditors or debt write-down). It is anticipated that this mechanism will allow distressed financial institutions to continue as a going concern, while shareholders will be diluted or wiped out. Moreover, the bail-in mechanism would help sever the link between systemically important financial institutions and the sovereign.
As outlined in the BRR, a bail-in would apply to all liabilities not backed by assets or collateral, but not to deposits protected by a deposit guarantee scheme 3 ,
short-term (inter-bank) lending or client assets. The ordinary allocation of losses and ranking process in the event of insolvency would be followed. Under the framework, equity holders would absorb initial losses in their entirety before any debt claim is subject to write-down. Next, subordinated debt holders would equally share any further losses, followed by senior debt holders. Finally, depositors not protected by a deposit guarantee scheme would absorb losses. A limited number of exempt liability holders have been proposed, including secured liabilities, trade liabilities, covered deposits, certain derivatives and short term debt with a maturity of under one month.
It is important to note that the design of a bail-in differs from contingent capital liabilities such as CoCos which provide for contingent conversion to equity in the case of bank failure (Koziol and Lawrenz, 2012) 4 . These securities are structured and purchased by investors on the basis of possible conversion from debt to equity, 3 While one of the objectives of the resolution and recovery framework is to project depositors, deposit funding of up to e100, 000 would in practise be recouped using a deposit guarantee scheme. In effect, this results in bail-in for all failed bank depositors, with smaller depositors benefiting from a sovereign guarantee. 4 Also related is the issuance of subordinated debt by banks. While subordinated debt should be priced to reflect the risk of bank failure, there are mixed views on whether subordinated debt results in market enforced discipline among financial institutions (Sironi, 2003; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996) .
with maximum losses equivalent to the notional security face value. A bail-in would result in mandatory conversion with the total write-down level determined by the level of banking losses. However similarities exist, with a conversion trigger required in both cases. In the case of instruments such as CoCos, conversion criteria have tended to be contingent upon bank capital levels deteriorating below a certain level (McDonald, 2013; Glasserman and Nouri, 2012) . In contrast, a bail-in is a statutory power allowing authorities to write-down bank liabilities, with specifics regarding the trigger largely undefined at this point.
Future funding costs of financial institutions will likely depend upon the level of anticipated write-downs that might be imposed on creditors. However, little is known regarding the impact of a bail-in on the different liability holders. In this paper, we retrospectively study the proportion of liabilities that authorities would have needed to bail-in to cover losses associated with the global financial crisis. In particular, we measure the magnitude of actual impairment charges experienced by banks after 2007 and apply these to banks that required bail-out. Finally, we perform stress test analysis to help understand the impact of considerably larger losses on creditors in the event of bail-in.
This paper contributes to the debate on the form that future resolution mechanisms will take. The results suggest that the aggregate impairment charges of e534 billion experienced by failed European banks would predominantly have impacted equity and subordinated liabilities under the proposed bail-in framework.
Cross-country analysis suggests that senior debt holders would only have incurred losses in Austria, Greece and Ireland, while depositors would not have been bailedin within any of the states examined. Moreover, even under stressed conditions with losses up to 20% of total assets, depositors would not have required bail-in.
The findings suggest that a bail-in mechanism that largely impacts subordinated investors would help to reduce the danger of flight-to-safety, in particular limit-ing the impact of bank-runs by depositors. Further, the bail-in framework should result in the returns associated with bank debt securities being linked to their explicit risk, perhaps reducing the excessive leverage associated with banks that underperformed during the crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) . Finally, a bail-in mechanism would help to formally cut the links between the sovereign and financial institutions deemed 'too big to fail', by removing the requirement for sovereign bail-out of failed financial institutions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an outline of the European proposals related to resolution and bail-in of financial institutions. Section 3 introduces the data related to failed and surviving European banks, while results from retrospectively applying the bail-in framework to European banks are described in section 4. The bail-in mechanism is discussed and some concluding remarks given in section 5.
European Proposals on Bank Resolution and Recovery
In order to ensure long term financial stability and reduce the potential cost of While the legislation underlying the SRM has yet to be ratified by the European parliament, any changes made should not greatly alter the main findings in this paper.
2012a). Under the framework definition, a bank would become subject to resolution when
• it has reached a point of distress such that there are no realistic prospects of recovery over an appropriate timeframe,
• all other intervention measures have been exhausted, and
• winding up the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would risk prolonged uncertainty or financial instability.
The framework further prescribes a range of resolution tools to be implemented dependent on the circumstances surrounding the difficulties experienced by the particular financial institution, including private sector acquisitions, 'good' and 'bad' banks to hold performing and toxic assets, a bridge bank to hold the assets and liabilities of failed institutions, and finally a bail-in of creditors.
In July 2013, the European Commission subsequently proposed the single resolution mechanism (SRM) as part of the commitment to a single European banking union (the single supervisory mechanism 6 ). for authorisation (insufficient capital); its net worth is negative; it is or will soon be unable to repay its debts; or there is a need for extraordinary public support.
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The regulation then requires that these facts are verified by the single resolution board and reported to the European Commission. The Commission will then make the final decision on whether to adopt the resolution recommendations.
8 Our synopsis is based on the presidency compromise text issued on November 4 th 2013, document 15503/13. 9 While the conditions stated define the general circumstances for bank failure, they do not prescribe specific triggers to instigate a resolution process. These might include quantitative measures such as equity capital or liquidity deteriorating below a pre-determined level.
The single resolution board will draw up a resolution scheme, one component of which may require the use of bail-in. The resolution scheme will determine the amount by which eligible liabilities will be reduced or converted to equity. The pecking order for bail-in adopted in the BRR is followed in the SRM regulation (Article 15): Common Tier 1 Equity, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, subordinated debt, unsecured debt, unsecured claims and finally uncovered deposits, and the deposit guarantee scheme in lieu of guaranteed depositors which are excluded.
Data and Bank Failures
In order to retrospectively assess the impact of bank resolution through bail-in on European banks, we first identified which banks suffered distress during the crisis and the resulting bail-out mechanism applied. Without an explicit definition of the trigger for bail-in, the timing of an actual sovereign bail-out is a reasonable proxy for our retrospective analysis. However, it is worth noting that as further details on the bail-in framework are worked out, a more considered bail-in trigger may emerge.
In this study, banks are divided into three groupings: Nationalized banks, which were fully nationalized by the state, re-capitalized banks, which received either preferred or ordinary share capital from government sources and surviving banks, which required no state support in the form of capital injection.
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Information relating to the bail-out status of different financial institutions was obtained from a variety of sources, (Molyneux et al., 2011; Altunbas et al., 2011; Laeven and Valencia, 2010; Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009; Goddard et al., 2009 
Empirical Results
To retrospectively estimate the impact of bail-in on European bank investors during the global financial crisis, we first take the distribution of failed versus surviving banks in As the bail-in mechanism would apply to all unsecured bank liabilities, it is important to gain insight into the funding sources utilized by European banks in the lead up to the global financial crisis. [ capitalized banks (4.2%) was noticeably lower than that found for surviving banks (5.0%). Since regulatory capital is determined relative to risk weighted assets, this suggests that failed banks reported assets with lower risk levels than surviving banks.
12 Considering the mix of depository and long-term funding, banks that were subsequently nationalized are shown to have largely depended on long-term debt funding, in contrast to other banks. In particular, the proportion of long-term debt for nationalized banks was 40.8%, compared to a base case of 18.9%. Given this higher dependence on long-term funding, these banks were potentially more susceptible to liquidity problems. However, in the context of the bail-in mechanism proposed by the European Commission, the higher levels of debt funding imply a lower risk of depositor bail-in with losses experienced first by debt holders.
Having gained some insight into the level of bank losses associated with the crisis and the funding structure adopted by European banks, we now retrospectively examine the impact of the proposed European bail-in mechanism on bank creditors, given in 14 However, the picture is not quite so straightforward when individual nations are considered.
[ alized losses resulting from the credit crunch or the possibility of a more severe financial crisis. [ Table 4 
2012). Our stress-test findings for nationalized and recapitalized European banks
15 This is calculated as the level of stress test losses over the actual losses for recapitalized banks, 20%/4.0% = 500%. 16 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this obstacle. 17 While the impact of contagion from a bail-in on insurance companies would be significant, measuring the magnitude of this impact is outside the scope of this paper.
suggest that in the case of 20% losses, consistent with the proportion of bank debt held by other banks, depositors would not have required bail-in on aggregate. As these losses would not just be limited to failed or recapitalized banks, we further stress-test surviving banks to a level of 20% losses. In this extreme scenario, with all banks requiring writedowns to a level of 20% of total assets, equity and subordinated debt holders would have been fully written down, while 77% of senior debt would have been bailed-in. Even in this case of widespread losses across European banks, perhaps a consequence of contagion, depositors would not on aggregate have required bail-in across failed or surviving banks.
These stress test results are suggestive of a large potential impact on bank funding costs, given the reality of heavy losses for debt and equity investors in the face of severe future banking crises. Moreover, they support the idea of the larger capital base in the Basel III proposals and the introduction of hybrid and contingent capital as an additional buffer against asset risks.
Conclusions and Discussion
The vast repercussions for sovereign balance sheets from the global financial crisis has led authorities to seek ways to remove the implicit link between the financial system and the sovereign. As part of a wider framework on bank resolu- Stress-test analysis demonstrates that impairments of up to 20% of total assets would have resulted in losses of up to 96% for senior debt investors. Even in this extreme scenario depositors would not have experienced write-downs, limiting the danger of a 'flight-to-safety' and associated contagion due to bail-in.
The results detailed, in particular those outlining stress-test analysis, suggest that aggregate bank borrowing costs for financial institutions would likely rise in the face of potentially large bail-in write-downs. In keeping with previous findings linking bank risk and subordinated debt yields, (Sironi, 2003; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996) , investors are likely to weigh up the likelihood of an investment in a financial institution being subject to mandatory write-down and expect a return commensurate with these risks. Given the link between bank performance and leverage throughout the global financial crisis, (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) , this would have the effect of forcing banks to have less leveraged balance sheets, more appropriate to the riskiness of their asset portfolios.
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The current draft SRM regulation requires banks to hold a minimum level of 'bail-inable' assets. This may necessitate an alteration in individual bank capital structures in order to meet these requirements. Zhou et al. (2012) raises the concern that banks may decide to shift their borrowings towards short-term and secured financing under the bail-in proposal. A shift in bank borrowing towards 18 Bank management have noted that increased levels of equity capital would have an adverse effect on the ability of banks to lend, a theory that has been strongly criticized, (Admati et al., 2010) . Further, under certain circumstances high leverage may actually have a positive effect on banks via socially useful liquidity creation to financially constrained firms and households (DeAngelo and Stulz, 2013 ).
short-term, bail-in exempt securities could be counter-productive, actually adding to the dangers of financial contagion. However, the proposal to ensure banks hold a minimum quantity of 'bail-inable' securities should mitigate this concern.
A variety of potential shortfalls surrounding the proposed European bail-in mechanism have been highlighted. For a large systemically important financial institution which is globally active, domestic European bail-in laws would not necessarily be recognised in other jurisdictions, which might result in ambiguity as to which assets could be bailed-in, (Gleeson, 2012) . In addition, countries which are early adopters of a bail-in mechanism might disadvantage their financial institutions in terms of higher costs of funding, (Schich and Kim, 2012) . Moreover, the resolution process as currently proposed is a cumbersome process requiring approval from a variety of parties, potentially slowing the process and creating uncertainty surrounding an institution. The exact treatment under bail-in of other liabilities such as repos, derivatives and trading liabilities (which account for a large proportion of balance sheet liabilities, table 2) is currently unclear, adding potential ambiguity to the bail-in process.
Another major concern with the proposed resolution process and the associated bail-in mechanism is the ambiguity regarding the trigger resulting in resolution.
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While the SRM details general conditions under which banks would be deemed to have failed, an explicit indicator regarding what constitutes a bank failure would benefit both regulators and bank investors. Indeed without explicit quantitative clarity on the trigger for creditor write-downs, investors may require a risk premium in compensation. Linking the trigger to the leverage ratio or tier one capital is 19 The ECB, in its role in the single supervisory mechanism, seems to be cognizant of this poential issue. Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, stated during his opening speech at the European Banking Congress "The key to an effective resolution regime is that it creates legal certainty, consistency and predictability, thus helping to avoid ad-hoc solutions".
one method that has been applied for contingent capital (Glasserman and Nouri, 2012) . However, a range of market based measures linking the trigger to equity levels in addition to yields on long-term debt may be appropriate in the case of bail-in (Sundaresan and Wang, 2013) . This would allow debt investors to explicitly determine the risk of bail-in from market related borrow costs. It is important to note that the establishment of a bail-in framework for failed banks does not Table 3 : Proportion of liabilities required for bail-in to cover writedown losses by country.
This table measures the level of 'bail-in' that would have been required by EU banks in order to cover losses from the global financial crisis. Total realized impairment charges are calculated for each bank as the sum of loan writedowns and non-recurring expenses between 2008 and 2012. The proportion of each balance sheet liability required to be written down to cover these losses is then calculated. * In both Spain and Denmark nationalized banks were incorporated into a 'bad-bank' resulting in no impairment charges detailed in accounts. ** The French bank Credit Agricole is treated as a collection of separate cooperative institutions in this study due to missing aggregate data for the combined entity.
